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Comes now the Appellant, Michael R. Barker, a frBB^ white, 
natural born person, a citizen of the State of Utah, appearing 
Specially, und^r threat, duress, and coersion, and claiming his 
rights und&r the Pr&ambl& and Bill of Rights to the U«S. 
Constitution, and his rights und&r the Utah Constitution to 
rebutt Respondant9 ss. Brief. 
NOT SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION 
POINT 1. Main® Riches has no argument to show that the 
Legislative District Court, subject to U.S. Constitution, Article 
1 has jurisdiction over a U.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 
i£, Citizen, who claims his rights pursuant to Article 3, Section 
2, of the U.S. Constitution. My privileges and immunities as a 
citizen of the State of Utah must be protected by the State. His 
argument that my argument has no merit is without merit. 
1 have noticed the lower court and several administrative 
agencies that I am in fact not subject to legislative tribunals* 
but rather I am entitled to privileges and immunities of a state 
citiz&n$ the lower judicial district court did take judicial 
notice of that fact, (See record pagB 35, lines 3 through 25.>$ 
notwithstanding that the lower court did exercise abuse of 
discretion and abuse of process, or malicious prosecution in that 
matter? and did so with full knowledge, intent, and malicious 
intent to violate my common law rights- (Bee rBOord page £14 line 
££ through line 9, and r&oord pagB ££i, lines 1 through IS-) 
Furthermore, the State of Utah and conoBmBd administrative 
agencies have been noticed, noticed to abate, and noticed to bar 
in the matter of a rescission of the marriage license on the 
basis of constructive fraud as evidenced on the r&oor^d in the? 
following documents: Declaration; Notice to PlppBar and Defend-
Rescission of Marriage; Notice to Abate—Rescission of Marriageij 
Demand to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction-Rescission of 
Marriage; Notice-Rescission of Marriage-Inform me what Law gives 
State authority to ProoBBd. No replys were forthcoming citing 
authority to proa&Bd. The lower court abused its' discretion by 
refusing to hear the rescission issue when in fact the Utah 
SuprBmB Court stated on the record that the proper place to h&ar* 
that issue was the District Court- (See Utah SuprBmB Court 
rBcord and statement of Judge Zimmerman.) 
There should be no issue before the court since the Utah 
Department of Health has determined its' own jurisdiction by 
failing to respond to the rescission issue based on fraud. 
Because my children hav& bB&n held ransom and oonspiv^acy to 
breech of contract initiated by Utah Legal Service, Inc., 
attorneys I am foraBd to dBf&nd due to threat, duress, and 
coersion. 
MEXICAN DECREE CANNOT BE ESTOPPED DUE TO FRAUD & HARM TO ANOTHER 
POINT £'. Respondants did not prove that the Mexican Divo^cB wats 
obtained through the mail- Laura was noticed on the telephone as 
to the Mexican divoraB arid agreed to all provisions of it. She 
refused to give her address but did agree to return to Utah to 
sign the Mexican divoroB dBor^BB^ i^hiah she did? r&cognizirtg that; 
it was legal- (See Record page 119, lines 1® through 17.) Laura 
acted on provisions of the divorce through shared custody of 
children, (See record page 94 lines 1 through 16, also Exhibit 2 
in Appellant's E<rief), and by living in a home provided by me &rtd 
aacBpt ing several hundred dollars pBr month- (See rBaor^d pagB 
139, lines 5 through line 19-) 
FurthBrmor^B^ Laura did not initiate divoroB action- The Utah 
Department of Social Services did through Utah Legal Services. 
(See Appellant Brief Exhibit 1> She thought the divorce was 
legal- (See RBaord pagB 119, lines 10 through 17.) The 
Department is guilty of malicious institution of civil action-
Even if it was p^opey^ legal action initiated by Laura, which 
is not the case, the action is for the sole purpose of financial 
gain to the havm ot another, and a Mexican divorce, even if it; 
was obtained through the mail cannot be estopped- (See Record 
pages £04 through £06. ) Responciants do not even address or 
dBfBrid against this axiom of law and, therefore, their argument 
is without merit- H§?a§S§j?Ql§ Estate, 181 P. 2d 69. The lower court; 
abusBd its9 discretion by not even cori^idBring that fact. 
Respondant's state that the Mexican divorce decree was not 
submitted in evidence. That statement is in error. The document 
was given to the lower court, Legal Services, Inc., and Utah 
Department of Social Services, as evidenced toy the lower court 
record file, and Record page 64, lines 15 through ££, Legal 
Services Brief Addendum, and a letter from the Department as 
•hown in fipp^llant* $ Bri#f IAS ©xhib.it 42. Smm AIBO, th$t Judg* 
doesn't care if it's marked for exhibit since he reads it and it 
is in the file, Record page 98, lines £1 through ££. 
Laura perjured herself on several occasions on the record. 
(See Record page 117, lines 6 through 11? page 91, lines IS 
through £® along with page 93, lines 4 through 7 along with page 
94,lines 6 through 16; page 75, lines 11 through line 3 on page 
76 along with p 76 lines 9 through 165 page 76 line £5 through 
line 10 on page 77; page 64, lines 11 through 14 along with page 
66, lines £4, line 1 on page 67, along with Appellant's Brief-
Exhibit 3. PI so, Record page 98, lines 11 through ££. 
The new a^ard of divorce to Laura was an abuse of discretion 
since it is obvious from the previously cited record that Laura 
does not tell the truth. The judge took her word that she was 
cornered in the bathroom when in fact it had two doors plus the 
fact that the physical violence she inflicted on me was in the 
living room. Respondants even admit that the divorce could be 
properly awarded to either of the parties. See Record page 87, 
lines 4 through 8. 
She did in fact believe the Mexican divorce to be legal as 
evidenced on Recoy^d page 119, lines 15 & 17, and page 113, lines 
£3 & £5. fill action on the part of both parties pointed to the 
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divoroB being acted upon, ie«, Laura's assaults on Appellant, his 
moving to accept other employment in St- George, Utah, etc. 
JOINDER IS PROPER 
POINT 3. Appellant has pointed out in his Brief that conspiracy 
to breech of contract and fraud, along with other stated 
i .-•'.. ;s fraudulant acts, are^ being perpetrated by the 
T
 > The !:.-• out and serving of an injunction 
r, „,.,......,. g defendant f. . . c.._. i-ising a r-ight undB)^ a contract 
on by plaint iff is a breach of the contract by plaintiff 
form a basis for the counterclaim by d&f&ndant9 and 
a counterclaim by setting up such fact states a cause of action. 
New parties may be brought in by defendant by the cross-
complaint where it is shown that they ar& nBc^s'sav^y to the 
determination of the cause. £ha,lmer* y^ Trent, Lit RBpm 11-88. (See 
Appellant's Rm&nd&d Complaint, £*6 FB'D* 1987, for the various 
illegal and fraudulent actions arising out of the Social Services 
d i vorce act i on.> 
Several causes of action arB propBr^ly joined where the 
subject—matter was for a tort arising out of certain wrongful 
continuous official acts, causes of action are 
properly joined in one a^.vwr*, and the complaint reaches the 
substantial right without resorting to a needless multiplicity of 
actions. Wilson 1'«L §MlIiY§.D? Ut Rep. 17- 3^1 $ lECi. £2t. Y.;L. 
MSlBty.eg* Ut RBQ. 16-398. 
Furthermore, Appellant is a Utah State citizen whose 
sovereign rights have been violated. (See Appellant's Brief for 
*•"
 :
""c?nt on Joinder). Respondants' claim that there is no propB^ 
joinder and no cause of action is without merit. 
It is both duty and prerogative of Supreme Court in equity 
cases, including divorce case, to review facts as well as law. 
Article 8, Section 9, Utah Constitution. Hu^^hreys y^ Huc«gHc§^§.5 
580 P*2d 193. The court did abuse its' discretion in ruling 
otherwise. 
SLANDEROUS AMD FALSE REMARKS TO BE STRICKEN 
POINT 4. Waine Riches has made a slanderous accusation against 
me Respondant's point 4 argument by saying that I seek to teach 
my children by making derogatory remarks about Laura. His line of 
reasoning and the attendant pornography citations from the Utah 
Code should be given no more notice than the sound of a pip 
squeak dribbling into a strong headwind. Riches, for some strange 
seemingly perverted reason has focused his attention on a remark 
concerning Laura's sexual character which was never before the 
ohi1dren i n any way, i nc1ud i no verba 11y. I will not comprom i se 
principle and refrain from telling my childre^n^ for example, that 
even though they witnessed numerous berserk actions, vulgar 
language, and lying by their mother, those actions are wrong; 
notwithstanding while they abborr those actions they should try 
to understand the cause and source of those-? actions, through long 
suffering while still having love for their mother. Nor will I 
go to jail for that instruction. I have simply maintained that 
the court was sufficiently vague and ambiguous, so that I feel it 
necessary to protect my rights pursuant to Article i, Section .1, 
of the Utah Constitution, H MO! Bti £!-:£-• y... Hyr«2H'C§y:§? 5£0 P.&d 193. 
The lower court did not consider the facts before it. (Bee 
Appellant's Answer to Amended Complaint, item 28, £6 Feb., 1987). 
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Respondants did not deny those facts at any time. 
I hereby request that the Appellate Court communicate to 
Attorney Riches that he cease and desist from cheap, 
uriprofessional, slanderous and untnue allegations against me with 
a warning that if further tactics are employed that his actions 
will be brought before the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the 
State Bar. I move the Court to strike Riches' pleading. 
COURT RULES TRANSFER OF" PROPERTY WAS FRAUDULENT 
POINT 5. The transfer of property to Laura from Mr. Beb did not 
involve any consideration. His reason for transfer was that he 
was being threatened and coersed by Legal Service, Inc., legal 
action. The transfer to Laura was done under threat, duress, and 
eoersion. The lower court abused its discretion by giving legal 
advise to Legal Service, Inc., attorneys to take legal action 
against Mr. Beh to clear titleon what it termed a fraudulent 
transfer of title. (Deoree of Divorae and Judgment page 7, lines 
11 through 14) « That property was obtain by me before I met 
Laura. 
REAL PROPERTY AWARD WAS NOT PROPER 
POINT 6. The? lower court awarded the house being held in trust 
by Mr. Beh to Laura on the specific basis that the er an 
needed a place to live. See Reaord page ££®, lines 4 through 3. 
I have been providing that house for the children but Laura moved 
out of it in an attempt to make me pay more money, as stated 
in Appellant's Brief. Since the lower court was only ^d 
about the children having a place to live, then there was no 
reason for awarding the house to Laura. The house was purchased 
foy me from the py^oceedSr of a home purchased before I even mei 
Laura. 7h& Court <»>aiti it understood that. See Record pag& 116, 
lines 1® through 17* Notwithstanding the lower court did abuse 
its' discretion by violating the principle that Baah party 
should, in general, rBCBivB the real and personal pr-opm-iy he or 
she? hrough to the marriagB. I bought that house from the 
proceeds of the sale of a house obtained before even mBBting 
Laura* Begs ton y^ BjC§*!§fe9Eh (1988) 646 P 2d 705. J§£§Pg£19Ei X*... 
:ZS§Sg£2§9Q9 &1® P Sd 3£"6, 32S,' (1980>. Laura had been living in 
the house per the MBxican divoraB mutual agreement, until the 
Depart ment of Soci a 1 Serv i ces i n i t i at ed new d i vorce act i or*. 
Furthermore, equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because a party has* 
come to regret the bargain madB* The law limits the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court where a propBrty settlement agreement 
has hBBn incorporated into the decree. k£*D£! y.^, L&DSU <1980> 605 
P £d 1S4S. 
The lower court had bBBn noticed that Laura may be a 
compulsive liar* See Appellant1 s Answer to PimBndBd Complaint, 
item 34. <£S rBb,. 1987), and proof of same in point £:, paragraph 
5, above? notwithstanding, the court did abuse discretion &rtd 
award the house to hBr* Subsequent to the award, Laura sold the 
house ar$d land which was valued at $£5,000*00 (which took into 
account the depressed housing market), for $15,000.00 cash. That 
sa 1 e t ook p 1 ac:B £'4 Au g u s t 1987 . Du r i ng a t e 1 epbone con versa t i on 
on ££ January 1988, Laura told me that there is only *1000.00 
remaining. My children have indicated the same to me. 
I should be compensated for the loss of the house in full, 
so as to meet the standards set by the Utah Supreme Court in thiss. 
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HU22&h£S¥§ v.. Hug}jBhrgy§, 5£'0 P«2d 1 9 3 , P]Ces;fcon 
V-L. EcgStSD? P. 2d 7®5, g r i f f i Q v.. G r i f f i n ( 1 8 9 8 ) I S U 
98, 55 P 84, 
To deny my right to relief on improper arid incomplete 
property adjudication is to allow Laura to fraudulantly obtain 
more support in the future because now the children have? no 
house. 
In maki nq property set11ement a court shou1d consi dens (I) 
the amount and kind of property owned by each of the parties? <2> 
whether the property was his before coverture or accumulated 
j o i n 11 y « U ^ C ^ P ^ , 19 5 3
 ? 38—3 —5, a s a m e n d e d« 
The house that I had provided is now gone due to abuse of 
discretion of Judge Don V. Tibbs arid my children have no house, 
CUSTODY AWARD IMPROPER 
POINT 7. The lower court abused discretion in awarding 
custody since the determination as to what was reasonable? and 
necessary for the best interest of the children was not in accord 
with the facts. Nor did the court pnoDenly determine who was the 
primary canetaker in light of the facts. 
Record page 69, line 1 through line 18 on page 77 indicates 
that I was the primary caretaker of the children., Currently 
Laura is able to spend more time with the children because the 
Department of Social Services is giving her money to do so. Laura 
is unable to cane for the children herself. Even after having 
received two years of job training from the Department. She is> 
off of welfare now because she frauded the court by selling 
Appellant's house at a nonprudent and ridiculous low price and 
has spent nearly all of the money from the sale, which is 
irresponsible to the long term needs of the childrBn, The 
children now havB no house because Laura f'raud^d the court by 
selling the house which the judge awarded on the specific basis 
that the children have a place to live. In four months at least 
$12,000*00, the entire proceeds from the sale of the house, has 
been spent. Laura is not a fit p^y^Bon to handle the financial 
responsibility to meet the needs of the childr&n. \4h&r& is the 
house, I continually provided for my children, that Judge Tibbs 
took away by advising Attorney Maine Riches^ to initiate legal 
action against the trustee? Turned over to a financially 
incompetant person who does not even want to be a mother. (See 
Appellant's Answer to Respondant's Amended Complaint point £9, 
which was n&VE*r- denied) „ 
As shown Record page 69 as mentioned in the proceeding 
paragraph, I am the primary caretaker who has exercised the 
"highest degree of carB11 and also "great car&" throughout the 
marr^iag^ and divorce. I hav& provided "maintenance 1 1 and support 
throughout the entire time, ie«, providing food, clothing, 
she 11er, arid expenses for aut omobi 1 e, m&d i ca 1, ut i1i t i es, and 
general household, notwithstanding the fraud ^hich has b^Bn 
pev^pBtrated by Respondant* s. E©d®£i=*l. L§D£t §s*DB *2f §fei- t2Mll y.!L. 
MiilgC* 184 Ark- 415, 4£ S. W. Ed 564, 566. , Hughes y^ Hughes, La. 
App. , 303 So. £*d 766,769. That support has been for all of my 
children both natural and adopted. Bonwich y«_ Bgnwjich, 699 P2„ 
760. 
Laura may be guilty of the crime of non-support inasmuch as 
she signed up for "welfare" when in fact she was receiving 
maintenance and support from me, by moving from the house I 
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provided for the children and fraud i rig the court by carelessly 
selling that house. It is obvious that Laura has not exercised 
even "slight o&r®" for the well being of the children. Therefore 
the children should be awar^dBd to me. Humphreys w Huwghre^s, 
52© P. 2d 193. (See Point 6 above). 
"The right to n&aeiv€» current and future support payments 
under decree of divor^cB belongs to the minor children5 and that 
right was not subject to being bartered away, estopped, or in any 
way d&f^ated by the conduct of the childrevf^ s mother or third 
parties." Baggs y._ SQderson, 5£'S P. 2d 141. 
There is now obvious "substantial" and "material" change of 
circumstances from that which should have been appav^ent to the 
lower court in the beginning for ray receiving custody of the 
children. The trial court's action iVi the a¥4at^d of custody to 
Laura, in light of all the facts, is so flagrantly unjust so as 
t o const i t u t e an abuse of d i scret i on. 
In the determination of custody the lower court did not 
consider what is "reasonable and necessary" for "best interests" 
of my children based upon the facts, and the courts' choice 
between what was good and better was an abuse of discretion. 
Uz-QiL.Ba.v 1953, 30~3~-5<i>, 30-3-10. It is common knowledge that 
Judge Tibbs has a propensity to a\^and divorce settlements in 
favor of women. The lower court did not allow Appellant to 
conduct a pnop&n defense of his position in the ,r *• • ^-:: matter due 
to the refusal to permit cc of choice to aid him even though 
•••/llant was &i\ffeni- a I pain. 
Laura's claim that she took the children to th~ '
 ;:| 
the dentist, ! entertair false sine d 
not hav& a drivers license during the time we were marri&d. 
The lower court did not inquire of the children and take 
into consideration the children's desires regarding custody-
The lower court did not take into consideration the moral 
character of Laura as stated in Appellant's answer to 
Respondant's Amended Complaint point 28, dated £6 February 1987, 
but did refuse to hear the matter in opposition to the stated 
facts presented to the court. See Record page* 199, lines 6 
t h ro u g h 1 i ne £4 * 
I have nBVBr abbrogated my right to provide maint&nana& am 
support for my children as the primary caretaker,, rUtah-, £49 
Paa £50. 
VISITATION ORDER TO RESTRICTIVE 
POINT 8. The visitation order was not proo&rm I haves worked on 
the weekends for at least two years which, in essence, means that 
the lower court has ruled that I am not permitted to see my 
children during the y&ar* Furth&rmar&i to restrict the 
visitation to two £ week periods during the summer is not to the 
best interest of the children or myself- It is in the best 
interest of the children and it is their right to have a handing 
relationship with their father. The restrictive visitation is 
preventing that handing relationship for the children to the* 
father and the father to the children, especially in light of the 
fact that Laura has plans to move out of state at the Bnd of the 
school y&ar» The visitation schedule should provids an ad^Quat^ 
basis for pv^e^Brving and fostering the child's relationship with 
the noncustodial parent, over the desire of the custodial parent. 
K§II§§ ¥.z~ KallSS* &14 P.&d 641, 845 (Utah I960), Cooler y._Cooger? 
99 N.J. 42, 491 A-2d 80S, 614 <1984>. The court d 
visitation to holidays and for the *£umm&r a-.,.,., ,....,- ,v. ,«?n the 
children arB not in school as pBr -itten agreement; 
between the parties* The trial court abused its1 disc? 
§C0A£b? 72S P. 2d at 425. 
The Respondant's argument that I have no d any of 
the responsibilities of primarily taking oarB
 rf. en over 
long periods of time is, in light of point 7 above, K .t 
merit. 
CHILD SUPPORT _, „ ,„ , 
P~ 9, ThB child support order was not prxop&r. Furthermore, 
in a telephone conversation with Laura on 22 Ja / 1988 she 
£•:..:_..»;: to r^BOBiving money from her brother* The lower court; 
was not told of that income, and it is to the 
court. The court did not oonsidBr that La ad rBOBivBd two 
years of schooling from Social Services for job t- h 
inor&aB&d her o Barn. She is : B 
court did not take into consideration that Laura would avail 
herself of monthly fuel expenses a>- rnnmnt benefits 
wh iah &he is now doing. 
The court is abusing its' discretion by penalizing me 100 
dollars pBr month in , ' support inan^aBB when thv ::Lld 
reaches aq& IB in six months; at a time the s 9 
not incY^BaBBd. By doing so the court is in essence cir"-"-v'~""t ing 
the law which maintains • for B b 
of ver 18 years of age. Respondant 
the increase is justified because in the future years the 
expenses may increase. E*ut the fac es have? 
not inc^BBBBd^ they havB gone down. Judge Tifobs is not 
sufficiently clairvoyant to determine ahead of time Laura1s 
earning capacity, my &&rriir'i% aapaa it y, circumstances of" 
inheritance which alter the basis of support determination, and a 
multiplicity of other related factors, etc. 7h& lower court 1B 
attempting to require me to be the primary caretaker by 
cont inuing to pravid^ maint&naric& and support while d&nying me 
the right to be with my c:hildr-®n« The facts of Laura9 s present 
earning capacity were not aoriBidr^r^d by the court when the court 
abused its discretion by pBnalizir$q we pertaining to futurity* 
In addition, the Utah Department of Social Services, Qffics* 
of Recovery Services determined that child support payments were 
iri the amount of $500*00 p&r* month, ^hioh was to be $310.00 cash 
ar$d the house I provided* Those payments were accepted for over 
two years by 0.R«S. The lower court is attempting to require 
that I pay more that what was det€^rmifiBd to be within the 
guidelines of the Utah Department of Social Services, which is 
clearly ar$ abuse of discretion. 
OTHER ARGUMENTS NOT VOID OF MERIT 
POINT 10. Other arguments arB not void of merit. There haz> 
bBen no indication on the r^aord as to how or why my arguments 
arB void of merit and^ therefore, they must stand. Those 
arguments respondants have failed to respond to cannot now 
be argued by Respondants. I move the Appellate Court that 
Respondants remain mute on those issues which they have failed to 
respond to. 
***** 
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9i0i ywnci iciains nue and tne iraudu-
acts constitute theft. But where the 
r's title comes up against the rights of 
na fide purchaser, equity will weigh 
onduct of each to determine who will 
.il. In the case of automobiles, shares 
3ck and other property which passes 
e assignment of documentary evidence 
:le, the endorsement and delivery of 
ertificate to the thief weigh heavily 
st the owner. By and large, as we 
noted, such conduct is considered of 
ier.t gravity as to estop the owner 
asserting his title. It is simply a 
r oi who has the superior equity. 
es from other jurisdictions which 
the same result include White v. 
2±> Iowa 596, 36 X.\V.2d 761, and 
n v. Walker, 37 Wash.2d 12, 221 P.2d 
In each the owner of an automobile 
rauculently induced to part with both 
sion and an endorsed certificate of 
In each, the court held the owner to 
opped from asserting his title against 
sequent bona fide purchaser for val-
*f. also, Kelsoe v. Grouskay, 70 Ariz. 
u PJd 915. 
ause we are dealing with estoppel to 
title, and not with title itself, it is of 
mem that Mrs. Carr did not comply 
C.S.A. 8-135, as amended, the statute 
ting the assignment of certificates of 
Noncompliance with the statute may 
nade the transfer void; the fraud of 
n" certainly made the transfer void 
title would have been no better had 
>een strict compliance with the stat-
$ut we are not dealing here with the 
of "Sutton's" title—we are only 
ned with whether the Carrs may as-
leir concededly good title against 
ell, :he bona fide purchaser. It is 
ley may not 
e is, then, no irreconcilable incon-
y between the trial court's findings 
?ut:on" was a thief, and yet Bord-
[10] Finally, we must determine wheth-
er the trial court erred in denying attorney 
fees under K.S.A.1973 Supp. 40-256. It 
found that Farm Bureau's refusal to pay 
was not ''without just cause or excuse." 
We have said many times that the issue is 
primarily one of fact to be determined in 
the first instance by the trial court (Sloan 
v. Employers Casualty Ins. Co., 214 Kan. 
443, 521 P.2d 249; Ogden v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 208 Kan. 806, 494 P.2d 1169; 
Koch, Administratrix v. Prudential Ins. 
Co., 205 Kan. 561, 470 P.2d 756) and must 
depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each case (Forrester v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 442, 517 P. 
2d 173; Wheeler v. Employer's Mutual 
Casualty Co., 211 Kan. 100, 505 P.2d 768; 
Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 
783, 457 P.2d 34). 
In this case there was never any signifi-
cant dispute over the facts on which the 
liability or non-liability of the company 
would depend. Hence our cases dealing 
with an insurance company's duty to inves-
tigate are not applicable. In cases such as 
Forrester and Sturdy we have recognized 
that the presence oi a good faith legal con-
troversy, particularly if it involves a mat-
ter of first impression in this jurisdiction, 
may constitute just cause or excuse for a 
company's refusal to pay. 
[11] In this case we think the "theft" 
issue was well settled by our cases. The 
applicability of the exclusions, however, 
had not been tested; it presented what 
could reasonably have been regarded by 
the trial court as a good faith legal contro-
versy. In any event, we are not prepared 
to say that the trial court abused its discre-i 
tion or that its finding of just cause or ex-
cuse is without support in the record. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Approved by the Court. 
Dennis R. ANDERSON, Defendant, 
. Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 13422. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1974. 
Former wife brought action against 
Iformer husband seeking to enforce collec-
Ition of child support payments under a 
IWyoming divorce decree. The Second 
|pis tr ict Court of Weber County, Calvin 
|GouId, JM held that former wife was es- / 
stopped from collecting support .monw 
pvhich accrued prior to date of action, and 
Iformer wife appealed. The Supreme 
ICourt, Crockett, J., held that right to ije-
Fceive support payments belonged to minpr 
^children and was not subject to being b 
ttered away, estopped, or in any way dt-
Tfeated by the conduct of the former wi 
[o"r-third parties. 
K n Remanded with directions. 
Jypr EHett, J., concurred and filed a sepa-
r a t e opinion in which Tuckett, J., joined. 
£, Henfiod, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
& • " 
ft? Divorce <§=>352(3) 
j p " Wyoming divorce decree was entitled 
| t b full faith and credit. 
|2 . Estoppel <§=»55, 58 
£.-*' An essential requirement for estoppel 
K is' that there be some conduct of the obli-
g gee which reasonably induces the obligor to 
i rely thereon and make some substantial 
pchanges in his position to his detriment. 
Parent and Child e=»37l(l, IS> " 
i Support obligations can fall under two 
separate categories: (1) the current and 
ongoing right of a child to receive support 
money from his parents; and (2) the right 
°f another to receive reimbursement from 
the parent for support of the child that has 
ready been supplied. 
od of time to furnish support, the person 
furnishing support has the right to claim 
reimbursement from the parent, the same 
as any other past debt. 
5. Accord and Satisfaction <©=>2(l) 
Compromise and Settlement <&=*3 
A third party's right to reimbursement 
for support supplied to a child from the 
failure of the parent to furnish support be-
longs to whoever furnishes the support 
and is subject to negotiation, settlement, 
satisfaction or discharge in the same man^ 
^aT"a~ny-otho^debt. 
6. Divorce <§=>308 
The right to receive current and fu-
ture support payments under decree of di-
vorce belongs to the minor children; and 
that right was not subject to being bar-
tered away, estopped, or in any way de-
feated by the conduct of the children's 
mother or third parties. , 
/ 
lYQXCjftjSSlJJ? , ~-^ 
Agreement by father of minor children 
to make payments of $200 per month for 
three months, something father was al-
ready obligated to do under terms of di-
vorce decree, did not furnish any consider-
ation for claimed agreement between par-
ents of minor children that father would 
not have to pay any future support money. 
8. Contracts <§»75(l) 
An agreement to do that which one is 
already required to do does not constitute 
consideration for anew promise. 
9. Estoppel <&=78(6) 
Actions of father of minor children in 
buying a more expensive car and moving 
to a more expensive apartment did not 
onstitute substantial change in father's po-
sr\ion due to reliance on mother's agree-
t to release him from support obliga-
tions so as to constitute an estoppel bar-
ring mother of minor children from bring-
ng action to collect such support pay-
ments. 
HUMPHREYS 
Ci te as Z'. 
witness by the administrator of the dece-
dent. He apparently believes that ii he is 
called as a witness by the administrator, he 
then may testify to transactions with the 
dead man. Our statute, Section 7S-24—2, 
U.C.A.1953, prevents a party to a civil ac-
tion from testifying to matters equally 
within the knowledge of the witness and 
the deceased unless such witness is called 
to testify thereto by the administrator of 
the estate of the deceased. 
[2] This statute does not mean that a 
party may not be called to testify to mat-
ters not pertaining to transactions with the 
deceased without opening up the matter so 
that the survivor may testify to forbidden 
transactions. It is when the administrator 
calls the survivor to testify to the transac-
tion that the matter is opened up for fur-
ther testimony in that regard. The ruling 
of the trial court was correct in denying 
defendant the right to testify to transac-
tions with the deceased. 
The defendant now claims that the plain-
tiff cannot recover in this action because 
Terry, during his lifetime, filed a claim for 
workmen's compensation insurance pursu-
ant to Section 35-1-58, U.C.A.1953. This 
statute permits an injured employee to file 
for compensation and requires an employer 
who does not carry workmen's compensa-
tion insurance to pay the award made 
within ten days after receiving notice of 
the same. 
[3] The answer to this contention is 
that it was not raised in the court below, 
and we will not consider it on appeal. The 
defendant cannot ignore a proceeding 
which would undoubtedly have resulted in 
an award and defend an action at law and 
then if he loses his case claim that the ac-
tion does not lie. 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are 
awarded to the respondent. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and HENRIOD, 
CROCKETT, and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
520 P.2d—13 
v. HUMPHREYS 
20 T:2d 193 
Utah 193 
Caroi B. HUMPHREYS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v, 
Gary L. HUMPHREYS, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 13445. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 12, 1974. 
A wife was granted a divorce, and 
from both portions of a divorce decree of 
the Second District Court, Weber County, 
John F. Wahlquist, J., awarding the hus-
band custody of a son and making an al-
legedly inequitable disposition of property, 
the wife appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that in view of some ba-
sis in the evidence for a finding that, be-
cause of the somewhat erratic and imma-
ture conduct of thQ mother, a comparative-
ly more mature and satisfactory home situ-
ation of the father and his children, the 
best interest and welfare of the little boy 
would be served by placing him in the fa-
ther's custody, such placement was not an 
abuse of discretion. The Court also held 
that it was equitable and just that the 
wife be reimbursed for her $3,400 which 
was used by her as a down payment to 
purchase the family home, and that such 
should be a preferred claim on proceeds 
realized from sale, with priority just fol-
lowing those claims constituting liens. 
Decree modified; as modified, af-
firmed. 
J. Parent and Child <3=>2(ll) 
In view of basis in evidence for find-
ing that, because of somewhat erratic and 
immature conduct of mother, and compara-
tively more mature and satisfactory home 
situation of father and his children, best 
interest and welfare of little boy would be 
served by placing in father's custody, such 
placement was not abuse of discretion. 
U.C.A,1953, 30-3-10. 
2. Infants 3=19.3(5) 
Matter of custody of minor child is 
never absolute and permanent thing but is 
Utah 520 PACITIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
;ect to review and possible change or 
lification if changing circumstances 
~~ J953 , 30-3-10. uld so warrant. 
Jlvorc* C=>I84(6) 
It is both duty and prerogative of Si 
Tie Court in equity cases, including di-
ce case, to review facts as well as law. 
ist. art. S, § 9. 
•W«tt4_CS249£61_ 
It was equitable and just that wife, on 
:g granted divorce from husband, be 
lbursed for her S3.40O which was used 
ier as down payment to purchase fami-
ome, and that such should be preferred 
TI on proceeds realized from salt, with 
rity just following those claims const i-
i£ liens. 
etc N. Vlahos, Of den, for plaintiff and 
•11am. 
Dgcr S. Dutson, Ogden, for defendant 
respondent. 
ROCKETT, Justice: 
ainriff Carol E. Humphreys appeals 
:krng only those portions of a divorce 
ee which (1) awarded defendant hus-
l custody of their four-year old (now 
) son, and (2) made what she contends 
1 inequitable disposition of their prop-
le marriage of the parties in July of 
was a second marriage for both. The 
iti/f had two children, ages eight and 
and the defendant three, ages tight, 
nd three; (now all are nine years old-
and they have one son Joe Darin, age 
five years, issue of this marriage, 
marriage lasted tight years. Hut it 
ars to have been in difficulty for a 
derable time, perhaps nearly from the 
ming. It would serve no useful pur-
to detail the troubles which lead to 
egrettable, but what appears to be in-
Me, conclusion of divorce, which nei-
party now questions. 
e matter of the gravest concern to the 
is, the trial court, and this court, is 
the custody of little Joe Darin. In con-
tending that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in failing to award her his custody, 
plaintiff quotes in her brief and places re-
• liance on Sec. 30-3-10, U.C.A.1953, as it 
brmerly read: 
In any case of separation of husband 
and wife having minor children, the 
mother shall be entitled to the care, con-
trol, and custody of all such children; 
if it shall be made to appear to 
a Court of competent jurisdiction, that 
the mother is an immoral, incompetent, 
or other-wise improper person, then the 
Court may award the custody of the 
children to the father or make such oth-
er order as may be just. [Emphasis 
added.] 
It is significant to observe that that section 
was amended by Chapter 72, S.L.U. 1969. 
by deleting the provision requiring that the 
mother be "an immoral, incompetent or 
otherwise improper person . . " as a 
condition precedent to awarding custody to 
the father. In the place of the at>ove quot-
ed language, that section now provides: 
In any case of separation of husband 
and wife having minor children, or 
whenever a marriage is declared void or 
dissolved the court shall make such order 
for the future care and custody of the 
minor children as it may deem just and 
proper. In determining custody, the 
court shall consider the best interests of 
the child and the past conduct and dem-
onstrated moral standards of each of the 
parties and the natural presumption that 
the mother is best suited to care for 
young children . . . [Emphasis 
added.] 
The effect of this change is to minimize 
the often ill-advised and abortive attempts 
to besmirch the mother in order to obtain 
custody of children; and to enlarge the 
discretion of the trial court to act in the 
best interests of the child.1 Yet it retains 
the guideline concerning the natural pre-
sumption favoring the mother's care for 
young children. 
•ANCROFT-WHfTNCV CO. 
301 Br»nn*n Street 
S«n Francisco. Calif 94107 
f. Walton v. Off man. 130 Utah 1. ldfl I'.2d 07, and #<*? Baker v. Uak<?r. 23 Utah 2d 337. I K2d C72. 
HUMPHREYS v. 
Cti«"ftsa2o 
[1,2] What we have said above al>out 
not unduly burdening this opinion nor lie-
smirching the parties with their tribulations 
and frailties is applicable on this issue. 
However, because it is so unusual to grant 
custody of a four-year old child {now 
five) to the father, we make this summary 
observation: There appears to be an ade-
quate basis in the evidence for the trial 
court's conclusion that l*cause of the 
somewhat erratic and immature conduct of 
the plaintiff; and the comparatively more 
mature and satisfactory home situation of 
the defendant and his children, there 
seems to be a sufficient justification for 
the order of custody made as being in the 
best interest and welfare of the little boy. 
It is also appropriate that the plaintiff is 
given such rights of visitation as can prac-
™M ,!* tically be arranged; and concerning which 
both parties must exercise a high degree of 
4ft & forbearance and cooperation for the bene-
fit of each other, and more especially ior 
their little son. It is also worthy of note 
that the matter of custody of a minor child 
is never an absolute and permanent thing, 
but is subject to review and possible 
change or modification if changing circum-
stances should so warrant. 
We turn to the problem of the arrange-
ment of the property rights. In view of 
the decree as to custody, the court made no 
order as to support money; and similarly 
awarded no alimony. The plaintiff 
complains of inequity in the division of the 
personal property: the family automobiles, 
boat, trailer and furniture. We are not 
sufficiently impressed with that contention 
to be much concerned. But with respect to 
the family home in Roy. Utah, which is the 
principal asset they acquired during the 
marriage, we have concluded otherwise. 
The home was purchased by the parties 
in 1968 under a contract to pay $16,500. 
The plaintiff claims that the down pay-
ment was $3,400 she received from the sale 
of a previously owned home. Defendant 
concedes $3,000 of this. The trial court 
2. Utah Ontst. Art. VI]]. See. H: *<*• WVs* 
•. Wicm, 24 r u b 20 23G. 4(» I'.2d TrfM ; 
Hardinp v. Harding. 20 Utnii 2d -77. 4i>P> 
P.2d 308. 
HUMPHREYS Utah 1 9 5 
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found its present value to be about $25,000. 
Against this there is a first mortgage of 
about §11.000; second mortgage $1,800; 
an IRS tax lien $1,700; and the parties 
owe various debts, which need not be de-
tailed here, aggregating between $5,000 and 
$6,000. 
The defendant is a brick mason and con-
tractor. He has a very substantial earning 
capacity of $10,000 to $20,000 per year. 
The plaintiff was previously employed at 
the Ogden Defense Depot where she con-
tinued to work for two years after the 
marriage. She has a substantially less 
earning capacity, but is capable of self-sup-
port. I-rom the evidence it appears that it 
should be assumed, as each party contends, 
that during the marriage each contributed 
his entire efforts and income to the family 
enterprise and what property they accumu-
lated. 
The decree directs that the home shall be 
sold and the proceeds be applied: to the 
payment of the mortgages and liens above 
set forth; then to any judgments against 
the parties: $400 to the attorneys for 
each; then to the payment of debts; and 
finally that any amount remaining be di-
vided equally between them. 
[3] In their briefs and arguments both 
parties remind us of those aspects of the 
usual rules of review in divorce proceed-
ings which would favor their respective 
contentions. We note our awareness that 
it is both the duty and prerogative of this 
court in equity cases to review the facts as 
well as the law.2 But as we have hereto-
fore stated: 
. it is firmly established in our 
Law, that the trial judge will be in-
dulged considerable latitude of discretion 
in adjusting the financial and property 
interest of the parties: conversely, how-
ever, if there is such a serious inequity 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discre-
tion, this court will make the modifica-
tion necessary to bring about a just 
result.3 
3. Mnrtim-tt v, MarUnett, S Utah 2d 202, 
331 I'2d 821. 
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JESPERSON v. JESPERSON 
Che as, Utah. • ! • P-M M« 
Utah 327 
eta JESPERSON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
sm Leroy JESPERSON, Sr„ 
defendant and Appellant 
Nor-4013 
3. Husband and Wife <*»49Y<<5) 
Fact that home was held in joint tenan-
cy was not conclusive that wife had made a 
gift to husband of one half of the home. 
4. Divorce <s=252.1, 286(5) 
Trial judge has wide discretion in dtvi-
sion of marital property and his findings 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 20, 1980. 
and appealed from portion of a 
f divorce by the Fifth District 
ashington County, Robert F. Ow-
•o tern., which distributed marital 
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., 
: (1) husband was not entitled to 
compensation for his efforts in 
£ property owned by parties; (2) 
rt did not abuse its discretion in 
inding that, although mobile home 
in joint tenancy, there was no 
by wife to create a one-half inter-
sband and no expectation by hus-
t he had received such an interest; 
rty division ordered by trial court 
and equitable even though it im-
considered marital misconduct in 
the property division; and (4) it 
unreasonable for trial court to per-
to withdraw from marital property 
talent of those assets she brought 
marriage and award of 77% of 
assets to wife was not inequitable, 
rly when viewed in light of fact 
ras her financial ability alone that 
d the production of such assets. 
jment affirmed. 
ce *=» 252.2 
ividing property in marriage disso-
oceeding, marital estate is evaluat-
•ding to what property exists at 
rriage is terminated. 
ce «=» 252-2 
ividing property in marriage disso-
•oceeding, husband was not entitled 
1 of compensation for his efforts in 
ig property owned by parties. 
will not be disturbed unless record shows 
that there has been an abuse of discretion. 
5. Divorce «=>252.3(2) 
Jn dividing property in marriage disso-
lution proceeding, trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that, although mo-
bile home was held in joint tenancy, there 
was no intent by wife to create a one-half 
property interest in husband and no expec-
tation by husband that he had received such 
an interest. 
6. Appeal and Error <s=»854(2) 
Supreme Court is inclined tx> affirm a 
trial court's decision whenever it can do so 
on proper grounds even though trial court 
may have assigned an incorrect reason for 
its ruling. 
7. Divorce «=> 254(1) 
Trial court's property division in mar-
riage dissolution proceeding was fair and 
equitable even though it improperly con-
sidered marital misconduct in making the 
property division. 
8. Divorce c = 252.2 
In making a property division in a mar-
riage dissolution proceeding, a court may 
properly consider such things as the length 
of the marriage and parties' respective con-
tributions to the marriage. 
9. Divorce «=252.3(3) 
In dividing property in marriage disso-
lution proceeding, it was not unreasonable 
for trial court to permit wife to withdraw 
from marital property the equivalent ol 
those assets she brought into the marriagt 
and award of 77% of residual assets te wif< 
was not inequitable particularly whei 
viewed in light of fact that it was wife': 
financial ability alone that permitted th< 
production of such assets. 
John L. Miles of Atkins, Wright & Miles, 
St. George, for defendant and appellant. 
John W. Palmer of Palmer & Anderson, 
S t George, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from that portion of a 
decree of divorce which distributed marital 
matrimony, and further marriage rela-
tions between Plaintiff and Defendant 
are impossible. The Defendant has been 
guilty of gross and repeated marital mis-
conduct1 which not only constitutes 
grounds for divorce, but which should be 
considered in making an equitable divi-
sion of property. 
property. 
The parties were married on March 20, 
1973 in RosweU, New Mexico. At the time 
of the marriage, defendant was 73 years of 
age, and plaintiff was 68. Defendant en-
tered the marriage with virtually no asset*. 
Plaintiff, at the time of the marriage, 
owned some furniture, an automobile, and 
savings in the aggregate amount of $22,500. 
Plaintiff also owned a mobile home which 
she had purchased for $17,500 (cash) shortly 
before the marriage. 
At various times during the course of 
their marriage, plaintiff and defendant 
owned three different mobile homes, includ-
ing the one purchased by plaintiff prior to 
the marriage. On each of the homes, de-
fendant allegedly performed various land-
scaping and repair projects which enhanced 
the value thereof, such that each of them 
sold for a profit.1 Both parties received 
monthly social security benefits but neither 
was gainfully employed.* 
On September 1, 1978, plaintiff filed an 
action for divorce. Following a trial on the 
matter, the court concluded that plaintiff 
was entitled to a divorce and entered find-
ings which included the following: 
The Defendant, William Leroy Jeaper-
aon, Sr., has treated the Plaintiff cruelly, 
causing her great mental distress and an-
guish. Further, the Defendants acts 
have destroyed the legitimate objects of 
1. Who paid for the materials for such improve-
ment* it disputed. 
2. At the Ume of the divorce, defendant's total 
Income was approximately $241.00 per month 
In aociaJ security benefits. Plaintiff received 
S263.90 per month social security and 150.00 
per month as interest from an insurance policy. 
*. Beginning on the couple's honeymoon, and 
continuing through the course of the mamage, 
defendant apparently engaged in the practice of 
The court then proceeded to divide the 
property. Each of the parties was awarded 
his or her own items of personal property 
and effects, as well as all savings and 
checking accounts standing in his or her 
name.4 In addition, plaintiff was awarded 
the household furniture, fixtures and appli-
ances as well as an automobile. 
The only other asset of the marriage was 
a mobile home located in St. George, Utah. 
The home was purchased in 1974 for $19,027 
and sold just prior to the divorce for $27,-
000. The trial court ordered that plaintiff 
be awarded the following: 
(1) The sum of $19,027.00 as a return to 
Plaintiff of the amount expended by her 
in the purchase of said property. 
(2) An amount equal to 77% of the net 
sale remaining from the sales price of 
$27,000.00 after deducting the above stat-
ed amount of $19,027.00 and the costs of 
said sale. 
Defendant received therfnttowing: 
An amount equal \o 72>%Xi the net pro-
ceeds received by Pterrfuff and Defend-
ant from the sale of their mobile home 
and lot in the Dixie Downs area, after 
deducting from said gross sales price the 
sum of $19,027.00, as a return to Plaintiff 
of her purchase price, and the costs of 
said sale. 
vanishing periodically in order to visit other 
women. By plaintiffs testimony, these absenc-
es were often of substantial duration, and 
sometimes required that plaintiff send money 
to defendant in order to enable him to return 
home. 
4. Plaintiff claims that her individual savings of 
$22,500 were totally depleted during the mar-
riage. 
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rkers were moving a "burned-
ip" at defendant's shop. Plain-
d that he advised defendant 
r the accident occurred and that 
ructed to file a claim with de-
surance carrier. When his inju-
improve, plaintiff filed a claim 
Hustrial Commission in Decem-
tog on August 29, 1980, the 
ve hW judge recited the evi-
ed and\ruled as follows: 
ring all V the evidence, the de-
the witnesses and particularly 
sn records\he Administrative 
e cannot findVhat an industrial 
jrred and, theWore, finds that 
int is not entitled to workmen's 
ion benefits. 
I, plaintiff contends that this 
titutes "an arbitraryydisregard 
ice," warranting reversal. 
tandard of review of anVrder 
trial Commission was recently 
liser Steel Corp. v. Monfr 
2d 888 (1981) as follows: 
Court's function in reviewing 
n findings of fact is a sfrictly 
i in which the questiq/is not 
le Court agrees with/he Com-
indings or whether they are 
by the preponderance of evi-
tead, the reviewing court's in-
hether the Commission's find-
'arbitrary o / capricious," or 
Lhout cause/or contrary to the 
table] conclusion from the evi-
without/'any substantial evi-
suppyrt them. Only then 
Commission's findings be dis-
racketed language in original.] 
Istant case, the evidence was 
) whether the injury was the 
accident at defendant's shop. 
foregoing standard, we are 
affirm the order of the Com-
nuch as there is substantial 
lined in the record which sup-
lings. Defendant denied re-
ctification of the accident and 
plaintiffs own witness (a co-worke/) was 
equivocal as to whether an identifiable acci-
dent even occurred. There is nothing in the 
medical records to indicate that/the injury 
was caused by an industrial accident; rath-
er, plaintiff was initially diagnosed as suf-
fering from "spontaneous thrombosis of the 
right subclavian axillary v/in." The hospi-
tal admission record which was signed by 
plaintiff clearly indicated that the condition 
was not caused by ap industrial accident 
Not until subsequent hospital admission on 
May 27, 1980, for/an operation to correct 
the condition is/here any mention of it 
being industrially related. Shortly after 
plaintiff terminated his employment with 
defendant, he applied for and received un-
employment compensation based on the 
represenyftion that he was able to work. 
[3] JPIaintiff also claims as a basis for 
reversal that the Industrial Commission's 
affirmance of the order of the administra-
tive law judge violated plaintiffs constitu-
lonal right to due process. Specifically, 
'plaintiff contends that he was not given a 
full and fair opportunity to be heard by the 
Commission and that it did not enter Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
luired by U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-85. 
>n March 11, 1981, plaintiff filed a Mo-
tionV for Review with the Industrial Com-
missiWi alleging that the decision of the 
administrative law judge was contrary to 
the evidence. On June 4,1981, the Commis-
sion (onlyNtwo members sitting) ruled, in 
part, as folio. 
The Commission has reviewed the tran-
script and fileSin the above entitled mat-
ter and Commissioner Hadley is of the 
opinion that the\ Administrative Law 
Judge should be sustained since the Ap-
plicant did not mention anything about 
an accident to the treating physician 
while that physician was^Uking his histo-
ry-
Commissioner Saathoff i s W the opin-
ion that the Administrative \avt Judge 
should be reversed because the Applicant 
did report the injury to his employer. 
Since there is one vote for sustaining the 
Administrative Law Judge and one yote 
to reverse the Administrative Law Juda. . \ 
PRESTON v. 
CHeas.Utah. 
» result is that the Administrative La] 
jLdge is affirmed and the Motion 
Aview is denied. 
[4 i The Commission can, and apparently 
in thw case did, adopt the findings oil the 
administrative law judge. Whether a /ear-
ing is hwd and whether further findings are 
made is\A matter of discretion with the 
Commission. In U. S. Steel Corp.h. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 607 P.2d^07 (1980), 
we unanimously held as follow: 
Our statutes place the responsibility for 
decision on thV Commission, and not on 
Administrative \Law Jpdges. Under 
§ 35-1-85, it i s \ h e Commission which 
has the duty to maker findings of fact. 
The Administrative Law Judge's findings 
and order become fural as an order of the 
Commission under/§^35-1-82.52 if the 
Commission takes/no further action in the 
case. Upon review, the Commission, pur-
suant to § 35/l-82.54 "snail review the 
entire record/made in said case, and, in its 
discretion ntey hold further Hearings and 
receive fuAher evidence and make find-
ings of fact and enter its awardVhereon." 
The findings of the Commission Vre con-
clusive/and final (§ 35-1-S5) aWi the 
Commission's award may not be set, aside 
1 such findings do not suppor\ the 
i/ard made (§ 35-1-S4). 
The Commission's order is affirmed, 
rats awarded. 
PRESTON Utah 705 
•44P.2d7tS 
by the First District Court, Cache County, 
John F. Wahlquist, J. The Supreme Court, 
Oaks, J., held that: (1) husband should have 
been given credit for contribution from his 
separate property for construction of cabin 
during the marriage; (2) wife was entitled 
to property .she inherited during the mar-
riage as her separate property; and (3) trial 
court, having found wife in contempt of a 
prior order, should have adjudicated some 
consequence or added some finding or con-
clusion explaining its failure to do so. 
Affirmed and remanded for modifica-
tion. 
George W. PRESTON. Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Loma A. PRESTON, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 17597. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 30, 1982. 
Husband appealed from property set-
tlement in contested divorce decree entered 
1. Divorce «=»25£2 
In divorce action, husband should have 
been given credit for contribution, made 
from sale of assets he owned prior to the 
marriage, to construction of cabin during 
the marriage, together with proportion of 
appreciation in value attributable to his 
contribution. 
2. Divorce «=»252^(3) 
Even though husband performed legal 
services and contributed other work regard-
ing property inherited by wife during the 
marriage, wife's inheritance was not ac-
quired through joint efforts of the parties 
and thus, in divorce action, wife was enti-
tled to the inheritance as her separate prop-
erty. 
3. Divorce *»253<4) 
Having found wife in contempt of or-
der restraining her, -pending divorce action, 
from removing property acquired by the 
parties during their marriage, trial court 
should have adjudicated some consequence 
for the contempt or added some finding or 
conclusion explaining its failure to do so. 
Robert W. Gutke of Harris, Preston & 
Gutke, Logan, for plaintiff and appellant 
Findley P. Gridley, Ogden, for defendant 
and respondent 
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it held Boyce Equipment not liable for the August 
26 freight charges. 
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Before Judges Bench, Billings and Hanson 
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ATTORNEYS: 
Lowell V. Summerhays, Tamara H. Hauge, 
Kenn M. Hanson for Appellant. 
James P. Cowley, William H. Christensen for 
Respondent. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff Eddie Ebbert appeals from several 
portions of his final decree of divorce. The 
decree is affirmed except for the portion 
dealing with visitation. 
Plaintiff and defendant Barbara Ebbert 
were married June 19, 1976. They have two 
daughters, ages 7 and 5. On June 11, 1985, 
plaintiff filed for a divorce. In his complaint 
he asked that custody of the children be 
awarded to defendant and he be awarded 
extensive visitation rights. In her answer and 
counterclaim, defendant also requested 
custody of the children with reasonable visit-
ation to plaintiff. In September 1985, plaintiff 
learned of defendant's plan to move with the 
children to Colorado. 
On November 8, 1985, the parties presented 
to the court a proposed stipulated settlement 
under which defendant would be awarded 
custody of the children. The court accepted 
the stipulated settlement and heard evidence 
on grounds and jurisdiction. The parties were 
thereafter unable to agree upon the form and 
substance of the findings, conclusions, judg-
ment, and decree. Consequently, the trial 
court set aside the stipulation and set the 
matter for trial on March 27,1986. 
£ At trial, plaintiff attempted to amend
 t his 
pleadings to include custody * as a contested 
issue; The court denied plaintiffs motion. In 
its .final decree, the court granted both parties 
a^divorce, awarded custody of „ the two .chil-
dren to defendant, ordered plaintiff to pay 
$325.00 per child per month in child support, 
awarded defendant $1.00 per year in alimony 
for two years, established a visitation sche-
dule, and divided marital property and debts. 
The court filed its findings, conclusions, jud-
gment, and decree on May 16, 1986. Plain-
tiffs motion for a new trial was thereafter 
denied. 
CUSTODY 
On appeal, plaintiff primarily challenges the 
ward of custody of the childfnrtonclefendant. 
He argues the court's findings were insuffic-
ient to support the custody award. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986), held: 
[I]f our review of custody determi-
nations is to be anything more than 
a superficial exercise of judicial 
power, the record on review must 
contain written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the trial judge 
which specifically set forth the 
reasons, based on those numerous 
factors which must be weighed in 
determining "the best interests 'of 
the child," and which support the 
custody decision. 
Id. at 425 (quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison, 
649 P.2d 38, 42 (Utah 1982)). With regard to 
custody in the instant case, the trial court 
merely found "The Defendant is a good 
mother and a fit and proper person to have 
the care, custody and control of said two 
children." In Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 
994, 995 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
A mere finding that the parties are 
or are not "fit and proper persons 
to be awarded the care, custody and 
control" of the child cannot pass 
muster when the custody award is 
challenged and an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion is urged on 
appeal. 
The Smith and Martinez cases are disting-
uishable from the instant case. In Smith and 
Martinez, custody was hotly contested and, 
therefore, detailed findings were required for 
appropriate review on appeal. In the instant 
case, custody was not at issue. Both by plea-
ding and stipulation, the parties agreed 
custody should be awarded to defendant. 
Although the parties were unable to agree on 
proposed findings, conclusions, judgments, 
and decrees, each draft thereof would have 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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defendant. Finally, imm-
mmencing trial, the court 
as previously ruled on the 
t, grounds, and custody, I 
tat when custody is not an 
findings required when 
1 are not necessary. See 
:U, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
of the trial court to make 
xi issues). To hold other-
the trial courts to prepare 
d findings in every default 
parties presented to the 
sd stipulation, the court 
t as to her parental fitriHT 
a fit and proper custodian 
. We find the court's fin-
nt to support the custody 
hat the issue of custody, 
headings, was clearly tried 
as entitled to amend his 
y. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) 
>t raised by the ple-
ied by express or 
of the parties, they 
in all respects as if 
raised in the plead-
mdments of the pie-
be necessary to cause 
irm to the evidence 
these issues may be 
tion of any party at 
after judgment; but 
nend does not affect 
: trial of these issues, 
bjected to at the trial 
that it is not within 
le by the pleadings, 
allow the pleadings 
when the presenta-
•its of the action will 
lercby and the obje- / 
5 to satisfy the court / 
ion of such evidence / 
\ him in maintaining / 
defense upon the 
ourt shall grant a 
necessary, to enable 
party to meet such 
testimony heard at drial 
}f the children from [the 
, plaintiffs and defen-
with their children, ind 
es and desires, which |es-
(bjected to by defendant, 
sue of custody. Howe\^er, 
uaily relevant to the issue 
to custody. Furthermofe, 
"*s claim that he was eijti-
;adings, the Utah Suprc 
hough Rule 15 ... tends!to 
favor the granting of leave to amend, the 
matter remains in the sound discretion of the 
trial court.* Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 
360, 365 (Utah 1984). In denying plaintiffs 
motion to amend his pleadings, the court 
ruled, "Well, I am not going to allow you to 
amend the pleadings at this late date. If 
custody were an issue, you could have had 
evaluations done, home studies done. We have 
not done any of that ...." We find no abuse of 
the trial court's discretion. 
Despite the court's ruling on plaintiffs 
motion, shortly thereafter the court offered 
plaintiff an opportunity to make custody an 
TsluTXonccrningMfitalion,' plaintiff iestmedT* 
"I'm afraid if I don't see them every week for 
the kids' physical health. I've seen bruises on 
them too many times and welts." The court, 
clearly concerned with plaintiffs allegations 
of abuse, said, 
Now you've done it because I'm 
going to terminate this hearing right 
now, here and now, and I am going 
to just stop and we're going to 
have—I'm going to o rder a 
custody evaluation .... If what 
you're saying is true, then I think 
that 1 can, on my own motion, 
make custody an issue because I'm 
not going to allow you two to sti-
pulate to a custody situation which, 
in my mind, would put the children 
at risk. And from what you're 
saying, I think that's exactly it. So 
let's take a Five-minute recess and 
you confer with lyour attorney!. 
Plaintiff retracted his statement, thereby dec-
lining the court's offer to place custody in 
issue by ordering an evaluation. The award of 
custody of the two children to defendant is 
affirmed^ 
VISITATION 
Plaintiff argues the court erred in not gra-
nting more liberal and practical visitation 
rights and in failing to make findings concer-
ning the best interests of the children in light 
of defendant's planned move to Colorado. In 
determining visitation rights, the trial court 
must "give the highest priority to the welfare 
of the children over the desires of the parent." 
KaJlas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 
1980). The visitation schedule should be real-
istic and reasonable and provide an adequate 
basis for preserving and fostering the child's 
relationship with the noncustodial parent. 
Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606, 
614(1984). 
In the instant case, plaintiff and the trial 
court were both aware of defendant's plans to 
move after the decree was issued. In his 
complaint, plaintiff asked for an extensive 
schedule of visitation rights. The court 
trimmed plaintiff's request, awarding specific 
iplete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code*Co's Annotation Service 
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post-move visitation rights of three weeks 
each summer and alternate holiday weekends. 
The findings are silent on the best interests of 
the children with regard to the visitation sch-
edule. Moreover, the court only makes 
mention of the intended move without any 
findings as to whether the move would be in 
the children's best interests. The trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to make such 
findings. See Smith, 726 P.2d at 425; We 
therefore vacate the visitation schedule and 
remand the matter to the district court with 
instructions to enter additional findings of fact 
concerning the best interests of the children as 
•to appiopiiate visitation rights: 
n 43 
t^tttlTStJPPORT 
w 
Plaintiff next argues the court erred in 
awarding $650.00 in monthly child support. 
He contends the court failed to consider the 
necessary factors in determining the amount of 
support: 
^ 1) the standard of living and situation of the 
-'parties; 
2) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
3) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
>»4) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
5) the need of the obligee; 
6) the age of the parties; 
7) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) (1987). The 
court found plaintiff earned approximately 
$2,000.00 net per month^JDejendant^lthmigh 
I f unemployed^ is capable of earning 5700.0?) net 
\j£-fCper month. The court also heard evidence on 
the other factors. Plaintiff argues the wealth 
of defendant's parents, who made large gifts 
of money to defendant during the marriage, 
should have been considered by the trial court. 
Such a consideration would be tantamount to 
imputing the wealth and income of her parents 
to defendant, and thereby imposing a duty of 
child support on the grandparents. Such a 
result is contrary to the concepts of parental 
duty and common sense. The court acted well 
within its discretion in formulating an award 
of child support and we therefore affirm the 
award. 
MARITAL PROPERTY 
Plaintiff also argues the court erred in 
valuing and distributing the marital property. 
"Determining and assigning values to marital 
property is a matter for the trial court, and 
this Court will not disturb those determinat-
ions absent a showing of clear abuse of disc-
retion." Talley v. TaJley, 739 P.2d 83, 84 
(Utah App. 1987). Plaintiffs main argument 
is the court failed to accept any of his prop-
osed valuations. Such action does not consti-
tute an abuse of discretion. Id. In one inst-
ance, defendant valued her household furnis-
hings at $10,000.00 while plaintiff testified 
hey were worth $31,000.00. The court found 
heir value to be $5,000.00. Even assuming 
brror in that valuation, the division is not 
Disproportionate. 
1 Plaintiff also contends the court erroneously 
Amitted a $25,000.00 lien, in favor of defen-
dant's parents, on the rental property awarded 
•o him. At trial, plaintiff testified the lien had 
been extinguished, although he had no supp-
orting documentation. Furthermore, in argu-
ments before the trial court and this Court, it 
is this Court's understanding that defendant 
will arrange for the necessary documents to 
{extinguish the lien. Based upon that premise, 
jahe division of mat ital pi opt l ty u tf fu uitd. i m^m* 
BIAS 
Plaintiff last argues the trial court was 
biased and predisposed to award custody to 
defendant. Plaintiff presented to this Court his 
counsel's affidavit in support of his argument. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on appeal 
to this Court. Pilcher v. State, Dep't of Social 
Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, plaintiff failed to object to the 
trial court's alleged expressions of bias; he 
therefore may not claim prejudicial error on 
appeal. Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 
389 P.2d 734 (1964). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs remaining claims are without 
merit. The judgment and decree of the trial 
court is affirmed in all respects except the 
visitation award. That portion of the decree is 
vacated and the case is remanded for fun her 
evidentiary proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson, Judge 
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